THE capital of the most militarised province in the country
has been attacked yet again by terrorists. The Bethel Memorial Methodist
Church in Quetta was attacked yesterday by suicide bombers; at least
nine people were killed and many more injured. An attack almost
certainly meant to spread fear countrywide among a beleaguered Christian
community preparing to celebrate Christmas, the state has responded in a
disturbingly reflexive manner by praising security personnel at the
scene of the attack for preventing a greater attack. While heroic and
alert security personnel may have prevented a greater tragedy, the
attackers were undeniably successful. Indeed, the recurring question of
how secure zones in Quetta are entered with seeming ease by militants
remains unanswered. Quetta is neither a border town nor a provincial
city with a scarcity of security resources. Perhaps state officials are
concerned about maintaining morale among the general public and in the
lower tiers of the security apparatus, but the denial of reality can
have its own debilitating effects.
While the roots of
terrorism in Balochistan are undeniably complex, there has been a
tendency to try and separate it from militant violence elsewhere in the
country. Certainly, a low-level nationalist insurgency and an unstable
border with two neighbouring countries put Balochistan’s security
challenges in a different perspective, but terrorist attacks such as
against a church in Quetta cannot be separated from the national
militant threat. From Fata to Karachi, Peshawar to Quetta and Rawalpindi
to Lahore, there may be different militant networks active, but they
are often part of the same spectrum. The interconnected fight against
militancy and extremism also plays its part, with militant networks
acquiring the knowledge to attack in new parts of the country by tapping
into local extremist networks. The ad hoc, piecemeal strategy of the
state to combat militancy, terrorism and extremism has not worked.
Arguably, an ad hoc, piecemeal approach by the state allows militant
groups to regenerate or evolve.
While state officials
will pledge to step up security at churches and Christian sites across
the country in the run-up to Christmas, the reality is that the
terrorists will always have a greater range of targets. The Easter
Sunday bombing in Lahore in 2016 targeted a public park frequented by
local communities celebrating. It ought to be obvious that attacks must
be stopped at the stage of conception and organisation if ever true
stability and normality are to return to Pakistan. Unhappily, the state
appears to be caught in a defensive crouch, lashing out at real and
perceived external enemies but unable to bring greater coherence and
organisation to the fight against militancy. With an election on the
horizon, the political class fiercely divided, and the civil and
military facets of the state seemingly in conflict with each other, the
months ahead could hold great danger.
