AND there it is. The slightest of course corrections.
Avoiding chaos for now; salvaging stability, for now. It is the familiar
— sometimes, great — Pakistani escape.
How do they do it?
Between
the ever-present fear of the top blowing off or the bottom falling
away, the Pakistan project has usually stumbled on. Maddening, scary,
infuriating, depressing — or maybe just lucky.
For all his disruptiveness, Imran has not yet proved to be the great destroyer he is feared to be.
But enough merciful moments and near mea culpas to generally hold the whole enterprise together.
This
time, it’s been a veritable Christmas miracle or perhaps the ghost of
Jinnah guiding us back from the edge: four slight adjustments by four
men who hold great sway over our political fate.
Traceable
in the adjustments are internal — institutional — compulsions that
triggered an external backlash which helped forced the correction.
Start with the chief.
The
horror in Faizabad was a problem that wasn’t going away. It’s one thing
for a government to be mauled by the boys. It’s another to be mauled by
a bunch of psychopaths.
It’s something else altogether
for a mauling to be perceived as a combination of the two. The Faizabad
denouement was like the world’s nightmare of Pakistan coming to horrible
life.
The cost of protecting the institution from an
incendiary conversation turned out to be a conversation in hostile and
questioning quarters about what the real problem in Pakistan may be.
And it was threatening to get ugly.
The
mainstreaming conversation was being pulled in disturbing directions
that turned questions on their heads. Who was controlling whom; was the
mainstream being extremised; where would this end?
Something
had to be done. The measure chosen has been spun as bold and
courageous, but it is not. It was the least of the options available.
The
Senate is docile, the Senate is marginalised and the Senate is a
minority-ruled house. It was the safest, softest of options available.
Enough
to get the job done — to suck the poison hanging in the air
post-Faizabad — without really making any concession. Disturbing
questions countered by amenable optics.
On to the other chief.
His
is a house divided. That’s just a juridical fact. Try reconciling the
original three disqualifiers with the final five disqualifiers with the
recent half-disqualification, half-not — and, well, you can’t.
It’s a hot mess.
If
you forget what the chief said and think about what it meant, a warning
shot has been fired. Not necessarily in the direction of detractors but
across the bow of the court.
For now, the big decisions
are out of the way. But as the election nears, the petitions will pile
up again. A court that is willing to wade into political waters is a
court that will get sucked in deeper.
Candidates and
their aunts will rush to get opponent candidates disqualified on pretext
after pretext. It’s a familiar pre-election ritual, but with added
significance this time round because of recent goings-on.
The
chief’s message can interpretatively be flipped on its head. Scolding
detractors for their unhinged criticisms of the court is also a reminder
to the rest of the court of the dangers of populism.
The
judicial vehicle cannot carry the republic. The more it mediates in the
political arena, the more stress it will come under. This chief will
carry us past an election next August and into December.
By
that time, the election should be a settled result. If a few more
lectures have to be suffered before then, but the veiled message gets
through — so be it.
On to Nawaz.
This
business of clinging on has been a waste of time. The preferable path
has long been apparent. If Nawaz wanted to lead one last campaign, he
could have it. But then instal Shahbaz immediately after.
A
fourth-term, 10-consecutive-year PM was and is a ridiculous idea. It
almost invites destabilisation and mayhem. And since the
disqualification, another term for Nawaz could be collective political
suicide.
But if Nawaz leads the campaign, Shahbaz is the
PM candidate and the N-League wins, everyone will know the victory is
really Nawaz’s. Enjoy the adulation, save everyone else the pain. What’s
the point in trying again?
Maybe — maybe — Nawaz can
force his back into public office. But the first day of a fourth term
would mark the beginning of a countdown to a fourth ouster. The PML-N
may be Nawaz, but the PML-N is also in the business of winning.
With
Nawaz as the candidate, victory is possible but it could be
short-lived. So why not give Shahbaz his shot and the party a real
chance? Inexorable logic appears to be winning.
And finally: Imran.
For
all his disruptiveness, Imran has not yet proved to be the great
destroyer he is feared to be. Through the dharnas, jalsas, protests and
petitions, he’s managed to foment uncertainty and confusion, but kept
his eye on another election.
Since his disqualification
survival, Imran has been relatively tame. The court may have complicated
a coruscating response with the ouster of a close ally, but Imran has
helped by not trying to do anything much or deeply controversial.
He’s
even put some necessary distance between himself and the ousted ally,
and stuck to his usual demands of early elections and sundry
denunciations of Nawaz and the PML-N.
Good enough for now was Imran helpfully not making himself the centre of attention and wild controversy. He’s done that.
Four
slight adjustments by four men who hold great sway over our political
fate. Enough merciful moments and near mea culpas to avoid chaos and
salvage stability, for now.
