IT is an extraordinary riposte to perceived critics by the chief justice of Pakistan and it deserves to be analysed carefully.
A day after declining to derail PTI supremo Imran Khan’s political career
but knocking out PTI secretary general, Jahangir Tareen — who has since
resigned from the post — from electoral politics, Chief Justice Saqib
Nisar has lamented the politicisation of the superior judiciary by sections of the media and the political class.
According
to him, while his court is working hard to provide justice according to
the letter of the law, some judgements are being viewed unnecessarily
through a political prism. In today’s fiercely divided polity and media,
that perception is damaging the court’s stature and position as a
neutral arbiter.
His bluntness is clearly rooted in a
great deal of truth. The febrile political atmosphere in the country and
no-holds-barred commentary in some sections of the media have reduced
complicated legal questions to perceptions of which political party
benefits or loses from a particular decision.
The
judicialisation of politics here is an emerging reality, however, that
all sides and institutions need to consider carefully. Once the
judiciary is approached in a matter that is clearly justiciable and
within the jurisdiction of a court, the latter cannot simply turn away
petitioners because of possible political ramifications.
But
the superior judiciary may want to consider being more mindful of
public perception and issue judgements that are well argued, firmly
rooted in the law and establish good precedents.
Where there is a coincidence such as on Friday when verdicts concerning Shahbaz Sharif
and Imran Khan, seen as potential prime ministerial candidates, were
announced, political speculation is inevitable, though not necessarily
worrying as it quickly dissipates. But in the Panama Papers case, for
example, there was far too much controversy and inconsistency.
No
legal purist could have been fully satisfied with the court’s reasoning
and some of the obiter remarks by the bench were unnecessary.
A
newfound enthusiasm for invoking constitutional disqualification
clauses against the elected representatives ought to be revaluated by
the judiciary that cannot be expected to disregard constitutional
clauses simply because they may stir political controversy. However, it
is possible to make a case for reading disqualification clauses
narrowly.
In a previous era, the superior judiciary
itself noted that were some of the disqualification clauses to be
interpreted broadly, virtually no one would be eligible to be the
people’s representative.
The Supreme Court is large and
diverse. All the justices do not necessarily have to agree on every
point; intra-court dissent can be helpful in building a stronger
judicial institution.
Perhaps, however, the court can
consider why seemingly similar cases are yielding opposite decisions.
The Supreme Court is integral to a healthy, functioning democracy. There
is no harm in a bit of introspection.
